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THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE
SIR DESMOND HEAP*
It all started on July 1, 1948, the day on which the new, post-World War II
planning and development control legislation came into operation-the day
on which the famous (or infamous, depending on one's point of view),
historic, and controversial enactment, the Town and County Planning Act of
1947,1 came into full force and effect. In Britain, the land would, afterJuly 1,
1948, never be the same again. The 1947 Act, which was announced as being
fit to create a revolution among landowners and entrepreneurial developers,
was of a brand new, even revolutionary, character. The whole impact of the
1947 Act was to be a great shock to us all. So warned the seers and the
soothsayers and the prophets. But the British absorbed the shock, and the
coming into operation of the 1947 Act proved something of a nine-days'
wonder.
One of the most outstanding and novel features of the 1947 Act was its
provision that the development of land (including not only building,
engineering, mining, or other operations but also any material change in the
use of land) was not to take place until planning permission for development
(PPD) was first granted by a local governmental planning authority2 such as,
for example, a county borough council or a county council elected on the
democratic franchise of one man, one vote.
Thus, all 142 local planning authorities in England and Wales 3 found
themselves in possession of a new and powerful tool with which to control the
development of land or buildings. This tool was especially powerful because
the 1947 Act also provided that, in granting PPD's, local planning authorities
could require "such conditions as they think fit." 4 Did this provision give the
planning authorities carte blanche to do what they liked in the way of
conditions? This question was clearly settled in the negative when the leading
case of Pyx Granite Co. Ltd. v. Ministry of Housing and Local Government 5 came
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before the English Court of Appeal in 1958 and before the House of Lords in
1960.6
In the Pyx Granite decision of the English Court of Appeal, the Master of
the Rolls, Lord Denning, pronounced the now famous limitation in the
following terms:
The principles to be applied are not, I think, in doubt. Although the planning
authorities are given very wide powers to impose "such conditions as they think fit,"
nevertheless the law says that those conditions, to be valid, must fairly and reasonably
relate to the permitted development. The planning authorities are not at liberty to use
their powers for an ulterior object, however desirable that object may seem to them to
be in the public interest. If they mistake or misuse their powers, however bona fide,
the court can interfere by declaration and injunction. 7
Lord Denning's words were later approved in Fawcett Properties Ltd. v.
Buckingham County Council8 and again in Mixnam's Properties v. Chetsey United
District Council,9 both decisions of the House of Lords, the highest and, indeed,
ultimate court of appeal in Britain.
These decisions made clear that, in granting PPD's with conditions, local
planning authorities had to behave themselves. They had to remember that
they were public authorities exercising a statutory discretion and that, in so
doing, their hands were not entirely free but, on the contrary, were fettered by
the law relating to land planning and development control.
The scheme worked well until around 1960 when a change came over local
planning authorities. What was all this planning control about? New and (to
some) dangerous thinking began to emerge from the complicated depths of
planning control. Was this control, which had now been functioning for
twelve years, designed to secure efficiency, urbanity, and artistic
professionalism in the development of land? Clearly it was. But could not the
control go further? Planning control could be used for social purposes such
as, for example, giving to the "socially deprived" and the "underprivileged"
(both emergent expressions in the planning field) new libraries, new houses,
swimming pools, leisure centers, and so on. Once it was accepted that these
were legitimate planning objectives, notwithstanding Lord Denning's
remarks'0 and the cases cited above," the question became who would
provide these facilities? At this point certain local planning authorities hit on
the new idea of attaching to a PPD grant conditions requiring the developer
(the PPD applicant) to provide some or all of these facilities at his own cost
and expense.
And so Britain moved into the era of planning gain-in the United States
called exactions-and it was, and still is, as controversial in Britain as it is in
the United States. Indeed, it was more controversial in Britain than in the
United States although, even in Britain, the entrepreneur was reluctant to
6. Pyx Granite, 1960 App. Cas. 260.
7. Pyx Granite, [1958] 1 Q.B. at 572.
8. 1961 App. Cas. 636.
9. 1965 App. Cas. 735.
10. See supra text accompanying note 7.
!1. See supra notes 8 and 9.
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challenge the validity of planning gain conditions by appealing imposition of
the conditions as the law undoubtedly allowed. The developer did not usually
challenge these conditions because he was keen to obtain the PPD and move
forward with development as rapidly as possible before inflation and rising
prices put his development schemes beyond financial reach. Moreover,
appeals took time and the cost of development rose with every passing day.
There then arose concern over the actions of some local planning
authorities in connection with planning gain conditions. After all, a principle
was involved. Some felt that it was wrong that any public body should be seen
as "getting away with it." But the entrepreneur continued to waive his right
of appeal, preferring to pay "ransom money" (some called it "blackmail") to
get hold of his dearly desired PPD and move forward with development.
The reader is invited now to read the article by my colleague, Antony
Ward, and myself, which appears in Appendix A under the title, Planning
Bargaining-The Pros and the Cons: or, How Much Can the System Stand? 12 The
article speaks for itself and requires no elaboration here. Suffice it to say that,
after the article was published, the government called together the Property
Advisory Group, which subsequently reported on planning gain.' 3 The
report made some strong comments about the acceptability of planning gain.
In short, it found that the practice of bargaining for planning gain was
inappropriate except in a few specified cases.1 4
The report had its effect. It led to guidance from the Department of the
Environment in its Circular 22/83,15 addressed to all local government
planning authorities. This important circular appears in Appendix B to this
article. Like Appendix A, the circular speaks for itself and calls for little
further comment here.
Attention should be drawn, however, to a few of the more important
matters set out in the circular. First, the definition of planning gain is of
particular note. 16 Second, the circular states that "[a] wholly unacceptable
development should not of course be permitted just because of extraneous
benefits by the developer."' 7 This statement is especially important because
it goes to the very roots of the purpose of planning control over land
development-obtaining the right development in the right place at the right
time. The circular also sets forth the tests to be applied to any planning
12. Heap & Ward, Planning Bargaining-The Pros and The Cons: or, How Much Can the System Stand?,
1980 J. PLAN. & ENV'T L. 631.
13. I do not intend to suggest that the article caused the government to form this group.
14. PROPERTY ADVISORY GROUP, DEPARTMENT OF ENV'T, PLANNING GAIN (1981).
15. DEP'T OF THE ENV'T, CIRCULAR No. 22/83 (1983) [hereinafter CIRCULAR].
16. Id. at para. 2. "Planning gain" is defined as:
a term which has come to be applied whenever, in connection with a grant of planning
permission, a local planning authority seeks to impose on a developer an obligation to carry out
works not included in the development for which permission has been sought or to make some
payment or confer some extraneous right or benefit in return for permitting development to
take place.
Id.
17. Id. at para. 4.
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condition to ascertain whether it is within the law.' 8 Finally, the conclusion of
the circular is also important. It stresses that a developer, aggrieved by the
efforts of a planning authority improperly acting to extract a benefit for itself
or its district by way of planning gain or exaction, can appeal such action to
the Secretary of State for the Environment.' 9 The Secretary, in making its
determination on appeal, will undoubtedly bear in mind the advice given in
the circular. Consideration of the advice may lead not only to a decision in
favor of the developer but also to imposition of liability on the planning
authority for the developer's appeal costs.
Circular 22/83 carries two appendices.20 In Appendix A, paragraphs 3, 4,
and 5 are most important. They relate to the scope of agreements that can be
made under section 52 of the Town and Country Planning Act,21 the principal
British act in this field. Of particular note is the last sentence of paragraph 3,
which states: "It should be noted that a developer cannot be required to
enter into such an agreement by means of a planning condition." 22
All section 52 agreements are, or should be, entirely voluntary. It is
improper for any local planning authority, in order to extract from a
developer some quantum of planning gain, to pressure him, subtly or
otherwise, to enter into a section 52 agreement, knowing that he may be
driven to sign such an agreement in order to obtain his precious PPD as
quickly as possible!
The above sets out the British experience in this controversial matter of
planning gain (exactions). Has the situation been improved by the central
government's advice and warnings to all local planning authorities as set forth
in Circular 22/83? Yes and no; commei, comme~a. The fact is that no developer
has yet made a real issue of planning gain by appealing, first to the Secretary
of State and, then, as a matter of law only, to the courts. The whole of this
business of planning gain is a matter of law, and the whole of it seems to fly in
the face of the words of Lord Denning in the landmark case of Pyx Granite. 2 3
Thus, we are left in a twilight world of imprecision. Two questions arise.
First, where is the determined developer who will challenge the local planning
authority playing the game of planning gain to see what it can squeeze out of a
PPD applicant? Second, are the local government planning authorities going
to continue indulging, whenever they can, in the lawlessness of planning gain
or are they going to heed Circular 22/83 and behave themselves in the
disciplined and orderly fashion that is the hallmark of any well-mannered, law-
abiding local governmental planning authority? For the answers to these
questions, one shall have to wait and see.
18. Id. at paras. 6-8.
19. Id. at para. 13.
20. These appendices are attached to the Circular. See infra app. B at 48-50.
21. Town and Country Planning Act, 1971, ch. 78, § 52.
22. CIRCULAR, supra note 15, para. 3.
23. [1958] 1 Q.B. 554, 572; see supra text accompanying note 7. As noted earlier, these words
were twice later confirmed by the House of Lords. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.




AND THE CONS: OR, HOW MUCH
CAN THE SYSTEM STAND?*
SIR DESMOND HEAP AND ANTONY J. WARDt
I
PLANNING GAINS-SECTION 52
The use (and misuse) of section 52 agreements (under the Town and
Country Planning Act 1971) in the development control process is, these
days, one of the most widely disputed and debated aspects of town planning
law. It is a subject on which strong views are held, and rightly so, because it is
the one area where there is a very real danger of the planning system being
brought into disrepute. References in this article to section 52 agreements
embrace agreements made under section 126 of the Housing Act 1974,
section 16 of the Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1974 (and
the like provisions under similar local Acts), section 40 of the Highways Act
1959 and, indeed, any kind of binding agreement made between a local
planning authority and a developer on the occasion of the grant of planning
permission for development.
All these agreements provide opportunities for local planning authorities
to impose on developers obligations of a kind which could not be made the
subject of a condition attached to a planning permission. Let it be said,
therefore, at the outset that, where each party is ready and willing to enter
into such a commitment and accept the need for the agreement, then there is
no doubt that a section 52 agreement can perform a valuable function.
What this article is concerned to demonstrate is the manner in which these
agreements are being used by some local planning authorities to secure for
themselves some kind of benefit or gain which might not otherwise have been
provided, or even contemplated, by the developer. These benefits and gains
have acquired labels such as "community benefits," "planning gains" and
"planning bargains" all of which suggest that the bargaining process is a
recognised and respectable incident of the exercise of the development
control function. It is the purpose of this article to question that suggestion
and to draw to the attention of those who ought to be concerned with the
proper operation of the development control system some of the less
acceptable features of the planning bargaining process as it has grown up over
the last ten years or so.
* Reproduced, by permission, from 1980 J. PLAN & ENV'T L. 631 (published by Sweet &
Maxwell Ltd., London).
t See also Current Topics, 1980J. PLAN. & ENV'T L. 557, 558-60.
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Briefly, planning bargaining involves the withholding by the local planning
authority of planning permission for development until a section 52
agreement has been negotiated and completed. The agreement may provide,
for example, that the developer shall permit the exercise of public rights of
way across the development site, that part of the site shall be dedicated as
amenity or public open space, that new or improved roads or sewers shall be
constructed or that a particular part of the proposed development shall only
be used in a particular way. Sometimes the deal involves the developer giving
up land for community schemes such as municipal housing, leisure or
recreation centres whilst, occasionally, developers are actually asked to
construct or pay for the construction of such things.' If the developer is not
prepared to enter into an agreement of this kind then planning permission is
refused.
Clearly, where such agreements require the provision of amenities or
infrastructure which are reasonably required by reason of the proposed
development, or which are needed in the area or vicinity of the development
site and cannot conveniently be provided elsewhere, then there cannot be
much objection to the local planning authority requiring that provision be
made for them in association with the proposed development. However, the
town planning justification for some of the more extreme examples of community
benefits such, for example, as the provision, or the financing, of municipal
housing or community centres which have no real connection with the
development proposed or with the development site-is not so clear. This is
because, in the examples just quoted, the developer is being asked to provide
facilities which it is the local authority's statutory duty to provide themselves
and, in addition, because the scale of the community-benefit provision which
is being required of the developer is frequently assessed mainly, if not
exclusively, by reference to the estimated profitability of the completed
scheme. Thus, in such cases, the local planning authority are revealed as an
authority more anxious to find themselves participating in the expected
profits of the development than an authority found to be applying appropriate
planning policies to the proposed development in a straightforward way.
Admittedly, it must be difficult on occasion to know how to draw the line
between, on the one hand, a community benefit scheme (or planning gain)
which has a palpable connection with the development proposed or with the
immediate locality and one which, on the other hand, has no such connection.
For instance, it may be reasonable for a local planning authority to ask that a
developer spend money restoring a listed building standing on the
development site but it is clearly an abuse of discretion to refuse to grant
planning permission for an otherwise unobjectionable scheme of office
development until the developer has agreed to spend money on the
restoration of someone else's listed building at the other end of the borough!
1. A summary of the more common types of agreement is contained in Jowell, Bargaining in
Development Control, 1977J. PLAN. & ENV'T L. 414.
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II
THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES-"WHAT'S IN IT FOR US?"
The arguments advanced in support of the planning bargaining process
are familiar. They centre around the idea that it is the community which
effectively creates the increase in value of land attributable to the grant of
planning permission for development and, accordingly, that the community
should take a share of the wealth produced by the exploitation of planning
permissions. Now, this is by no means a novel concept nor, indeed, is it one
which, these days, produces much disagreement either amongst politicians or
practitioners in the planning field. It first saw the light of day in 1948 when
the State nationalised development rights in land at what must now appear to
have been the bargain price of £300 million. That particular scheme was
abolished before it ever really got off the ground but another attempt to
capture development profits for the community was made in 1967 with the
enactment of the Land Commission Act. That scheme had an even shorter
life and in 1975 along came the Community Land Act which, ultimately,
would have required that all development land should pass, before actual
development, through the hands of a local authority so that development
profits could be realised by the local authority on behalf of the community. In
the meantime development land tax was to have provided a means of taxing
unacceptable "windfall" profits arising from the development of land thereby
allowing the community to take its share. Thus, in the past the initiative for
the nationalisation of development rights and for the taxation of development
profits has always come from central, rather than local, government. Indeed,
it would be surprising today if the central government was prepared to allow
local authorities to make up their own minds on a political issue of this
importance. The Community Land Act 1975 is meeting the same fate as its
predecessors although the taxation of development gains remains in the form
of development land tax. But if the taxation of development profits is
organised by the State on a national basis, what then is the role of local
planning authorities in the scheme of things? Indeed, do they have a role in
this sphere at all? The present government has answered the question in the
negative by repealing most of the provisions of the Community Land Act and
providing for the taxation of development gains on a uniform, national basis
through the operation of development land tax. Thus, there is now no formal
legal procedure whereby local planning authorities as such can participate in
the recoupment of gains made through the development of land.
III
PLANNING CONTROL OR A SHARE IN THE SPOILS?
What then is the justification for planning bargaining? It is submitted that
there is no justification at all for local planning authorities seeking to obtain
their own independent share in the profits of land development. If the
government of the day has enacted that development profits shall be
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redistributed to the community by means of development land tax, then it is
not for local planning authorities to seek to have first bite at the cherry by
bargaining with developers seeking a grant of planning permission. This sort
of thing may have been understandable in the days of the Community Land
Act, but that legislation, and the political philosophy which lay behind it, are
about to be laid to rest. Accordingly, at least for the moment, it seems that
there is no authority for local planning authorities getting in on the act of
sharing in development profits.
However, whether local planning authorities should, or should not, have a
share in development profits is not the issue which should be of greatest
concern to anyone wishful to see a proper discharge of the development
control function. What ought to be of real concern to such people is the
manner in which local planning authorities are seeking to achieve their ends-
a manner which involves the use or misuse of their undoubted powers of
development control. There are serious doubts about the legality and the
ethical basis of the planning bargaining process which tend to be overlooked
largely because it is not usually in the interests of the principal parties to the
process to seek to upset what has been agreed and it is difficult for others to
demonstrate the locus standi necessary to challenge what has occurred. But it
really is high time that the whole process was critically examined in order to
expose the potential problems inherent in allowing the exercise of
administrative discretion to be influenced by the forces of the market place.
The system was never designed to be used in this way, as a most cursory
examination of the relevant provisions will demonstrate.
IV
THE LIMITS OF STATUTORY CONTROL
Section 29(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 provides:
... where an application is made to a local planning authority for planning permission,
that authority in dealing with the application, shall have regard to the provisions of the
development plan, so far as material to the application, and to any other material
considerations, and-
(a) . . .may grant planning permission, either unconditionally or subject to such
conditions as they think fit; or (b) . . . may refuse planning permission.
A local planning authority's discretion as to how applications for planning
permission should be dealt with is not unlimited. Section 29(1) sets out the
matters which an authority are entitled to take into account and, where it has
been necessary, the courts have never hesitated to control the exercise of an
authority's discretion. It is well settled that a public body holding the
privileged position of being able to exercise their discretion when coming to a
statutory decision must exercise that discretion reasonably and in good faith.2
The local planning authority's power to impose "such conditions as they think
2. Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., [1948] 1 K.B. 223 (Lord
Greene).
[Vol. 50: No. I
THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE
fit" has been scrutinised by the courts on several occasions.3 Lord Denning
M.R. in Pyx Granite Co. Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government 4 had this
to say on the subject:
The principles to be applied are not, I think, in doubt. Although the planning
authorities are given fairly wide powers to impose 'such conditions as they think fit'
nevertheless the law says that those conditions to be valid, must fairly and reasonably
relate to the permitted development. The planning authority are not at liberty to use
their powers for an ulterior object, however desirable that object may seem to them to
be in the public interest. If they mistake or misuse their powers, however bona fide,
the court can interfere by declaration and injunction.
It is precisely because most of the matters now covered by section 52
agreements would be ultra vires if they were made the subject of a planning
condition that local planning authorities have taken to insisting upon the
completion of section 52 agreements before planning permission is granted.
These agreements provide a way around the constraints imposed by the
courts on the use of planning conditions. Surely there can be no objection to
a developer voluntarily entering into an agreement to provide community
benefits-or so those who approve of planning bargaining would argue.
However, the argument does not end there. If, as is usually the case, when a
local planning authority come to make their decision on an application, they
make it in the knowledge that a section 52 agreement has been completed or
offered by the developer, then the authority are having regard to that
agreement when dealing with the application. Now section 29 provides that
they shall have regard only to certain things, namely the provisions of the
development plan so far as it is material to the application and to any other
material considerations. Obviously, it is necessary to look carefully at the
section 52 agreement to see whether its contents are material considerations
to which the planning authority are properly entitled to have regard.
It is clear that if the courts applied the same tests to section 52 agreements
as they apply to planning conditions, then vast numbers of these agreements
would be found to contain matters to which the authority should not, in law,
have had regard.
However, it may be unlikely that the courts would adopt such a restrictive
approach when considering, for the purposes of a section 52 agreement, what
is, and what is not, a material consideration within the meaning of section
29(1). But this still does not mean that the local planning authority can have
regard to whatever matters they choose when they are considering a planning
application. There must be limits to what they can take account of and those
planning bargains which have no affinity or connection with the development
which is the subject of the application, or with the development site, are not
matters, it is submitted, which can properly be regarded as material
considerations, more particularly, if they involve a gift of land or a payment of
3. E.g., Fawcett Properties Ltd. v. Buckingham County Council, 1961 App. Gas. 636; Hall (J.A.)
& Co. v. Shoreham-by-Sea Urban Dist. Council, [1964] 1 W.L.R. 240 (C.A.); R. v. Hillingdon London
Borough Council, ex p. Royco Homes Ltd., [1974] 2 W.L.R. 805 (Q.B. Div'l Ct.); Pyx Granite Co. v.
Ministry of Hous. and Local Gov't, [1958] 1 Q.B. 554.
4. [1958] 1 Q.B. 554, 572.
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money to the authority. Whatever justification there may be for a local
planning authority's wish to share in the profits made by developers, it would
be surprising indeed if that wish were ever accepted as a material
consideration in the determination of applications for planning permission.
V
DEVELOPMENT CONTROL OR PROFIT CONTROL?
The implications of admitting that local planning authorities may use their
powers of development control for the purpose of diverting part of the profits
of land development to themselves are disturbing. Such authorities are
entrusted with the privilege of determining applications for planning
permission by reference to sound planning principles and not otherwise.
They have a monopoly of the grant of planning permission for development
and, once they allow self-interest to enter into their considerations, they must
necessarily prejudice the proper exercise of the development control
function. It is not good enough for authorities to argue, as some do, that they
are entitled to have regard to agreements freely entered into by applicants for
planning permission. The truth is that, more often than not, the initiative for
these agreements comes from the authorities who then proceed to indicate to
the developer that his planning permission depends upon his willingness to
do as they ask. The authorities have a disproportionately strong bargaining
position by reason of their ability to give or withhold planning permission.
The developer can, as is known, take the matter out of the local planning
authority's hands by lodging an appeal to the Secretary of State but the
expense and, what is often worse, the delay thereby involved, act as powerful
disincentives to any such course. If an appeal is lodged, the developer can be
confronted with the unwholesome spectacle of planning authority officers
seeking to argue, apparently in all sincerity, for policies which, a few months
earlier, they were quite ready to abandon on the right terms. Must not all this
be unattractive on any angle of approach?
No doubt with one eye on section 29(1), there is developing a tendency
amongst planning authorities to include in their structure and local plans
provisions (however vague) as to their expectations about planning gains.
Even so, the view is taken that such provisions, even when expressed in
unequivocal terms, cannot validate something which is fundamentally alien to
the development control function.
VI
PLANNING PRINCIPLES AND COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGE
The planning process can lead to all kinds of other difficulties. For
instance, if the authorities are to put themselves in a position to bargain with a
developer they must be able to point, at the outset, to some aspect of the
proposed development which, in planning terms, is unacceptable but which, if
the bargained terms were right, they would be prepared to accept. Now, if
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that which is offered by the developer is designed to overcome the particular
planning objection taken by the authorities then it would be perfectly right
and proper for the two parties to enter into an appropriate agreement. But if,
as is often the case, the authorities agree to waive their planning objection in
return for a planning gain which has no connection whatever with the
principle, policy or criterion which is to be waived, then either the authorities
never really believed in the planning objection in the first place or, what is
worse, they have taken a conscious decision to sell out to the developer.
The temptation to forsake sound planning principles for commercial
advantage is obvious and it is not made any easier for the local planning
authority to resist by the fact that negotiations for these planning bargains are
almost invariably conducted in secret. There is usually no opportunity for
members of the public to express a view on what is going on and there is no
right of appeal available to a third party who objects to the terms of the
bargain made in his name by the local planning authority. Although the
courts have in the past expressed themselves willing to control the exercise of
discretion by public authorities it is by no means certain that it would be
possible for a third party, even one with the necessary energy and resources,
to bring such a matter before the courts. 5
VII
WHAT CHANCE OF A CHALLENGE?
It is because the likelihood of challenge in the courts is small that the
practice of planning bargaining has been enabled to develop as it has done-
in such an unrestrained fashion. Even if they could discover what was going
on, third parties have no obvious way of bringing the issues before the court.
As for developers they are most unlikely to want to rock the boat once they
have a planning permission and so, albeit grudgingly, and often
complainingly, they encourage, by acquiescence, the continuation of the
practice.
But the absence of challenge should certainly not be taken as evidence that
all is well. Bargaining in the field of statutory controls is inherently
objectionable. Development control is a regulatory function-and it is no
more than that-the powers available to a local planning authority being, like
it or not, negative in nature. The system was not designed, nor is it suitable,
for achieving the ulterior object of sharing out development profits in land.
So far the Department of the Environment has been uncharacteristically
reticent about planning bargaining. Bearing in mind that the practice is
growing and that it is unlikely to be tested in the courts the Department really
should decide (and declare) what is its attitude to it all. It is, in the nature of
things, difficult to be precise about the extent of the practice of planning
bargaining but nothing is more certain than that some local planning
5. See Parkes, Remedies of Third Parties in Planning Law, 1978 J. PLAN. & ENV'T L. 739.
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1. In October 1981 the Secretary of State for the Environment published the
report of his Property Advisory Group Planning Gain. In publishing that
report he invited comment from interested bodies and people. He and the
Secretary of State for Wales have now considered the report in the light of
comments received, and the purpose of this circular is to give guidance to
local authorities and others concerned.
Definition
2. "Planning gain" is a term which has come to be applied whenever, in
connection with a grant of planning permission, a local planning authority
seeks to impose on a developer an obligation to carry out works not included
in the development for which permission has been sought or to make some
payment or confer some extraneous right or benefit in return for permitting
development to take place. As such, it is distinct from any alterations or
modifications which the planning authority may properly seek to secure to the
development that is the subject of the planning application-such as changes
intended to reduce the scale or intensity of the proposed development, or to
improve its layout or its impact on the local environment. In the case of
"planning gain" the obligation sometimes arises from the terms in which
development is permitted, e.g. from a condition of the planning permission,
(conditions are dealt with in Ministry of Housing and Local Government and
Welsh Office Circular 5/68 which is currently being revised) and sometimes
from an agreement made in association with it. In some cases the developer
may offer some such works or payment in applying for planning permission or
in the course of subsequent negotiations: the advice in this circular is relevant
in those circumstances as well as to cases where the authority seeks to impose
such obligations. This circular is not concerned with cases where the
authority is disposing of land which it owns and where the terms and
conditions on which it is prepared to sell are matters for negotiation with
prospective purchasers. Nor is it concerned with matters arising from other
legislation, e.g. the requisitioning of the provision of a water supply or of a
public sewer from the Water Authority under the Water Acts 1945 and 1973,
or agreements made under the Public Health Act 1936.
Legal Aspects
3. Guidance on these is set out in Appendix [2A]. The main points to bear
in mind are:
(1) the limitations on the scope for imposing positive obligations by way of
conditions on permissions;
(2) the scope of the powers under section 52 of the Town and Country Planning Act
1971 to enter into agreements with persons having an interest in land for the purpose
of restricting or regulating the development or use of the land,
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(3) the wider scope for making agreements under section 111 of the Local
Government Act 1972, which are normally enforceable only against the person or
body with whom the agreement was made.
General Policy
4. It is a matter of law as well as of good administration that planning
applications should be considered on their merits having regard to the
provisions of the development plan and any other material consideration and
that they should be refused only when this serves a clear planning purpose
and the economic effects have been taken into account. (More detailed advice
is given in DoE Circular 22/80 (WO Circular 4080)). By the same token, the
question of imposing a condition or obligation-whether negative or positive
in character-should only arise where it is considered that it would not be
reasonable to grant a permission in the terms sought which is not subject to
such condition or obligation. A wholly unacceptable development should not
of course be permitted just because of extraneous benefits offered by the
developer.
5. If a planning application is considered in this light it may be reasonable,
depending on the circumstances, either to impose conditions on the grant of
planning permission, or (where the authority's purpose cannot be achieved by
means of a condition) to seek an agreement with the developer which would
be associated with any permission granted. Such agreements may well assist
towards securing the best use of land and a properly planned environment.
But this does not mean that an authority is entitled to treat an applicant's
need for permission as an opportunity to obtain some extraneous benefit or
advantage or as an opportunity to exact a payment for the benefit of
ratepayers at large. Nor should the preparation of such an agreement be
permitted to delay unduly the decision on the application.
6. The test of the reasonableness of imposing such obligations on
developers depends substantially on whether what is required:
(1) is needed to enable the development to go ahead, e.g. provision of
adequate access, water supply and sewerage and sewage disposal facilities
(advice on the provision of infrastructure is given in Annex A to DoE Circular
22/80 (WO Circular 4080) and on land drainage in DoE Circular 17/82 (WO
Circular 15/82)); or
(2) in the case of financial payments, will contribute to meeting the cost
of providing such facilities in the near future; or
(3) is otherwise so directly related to the proposed development and to
the use of the land after its completion, that the development ought not to be
permitted without it, e.g. the provision, whether by the developer or by the
authority at the developer's expense, of car-parking in or near the
development or of reasonable amounts of open space related to the
development; or
(4) is designed in the case of mixed development to secure an acceptable
balance of uses.
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Appendix [2B] illustrates the application of these general principles to the
provision of car parking.
7. If what is required or sought passes one of the tests set out in the
preceding paragraph, a further test has to be applied. This is whether the
extent of what is required or sought is fairly and reasonably related in case and
kind to the proposed development. Thus, while the developer may
reasonably be expected to pay for or contribute to the cost of infrastructure
which would not have been necessary but for his development, and while
some public benefit may eventually accrue from this, his payments should be
directly related in scale and kind to the benefit which the proposed
development will derive from the facilities to be provided.
8. There is also a final test, namely whether what the developer is being
asked to provide or help to finance represents in itself a reasonable charge on
the developer as distinct from being financed by national or local taxation or
other means-e.g, as a charge on those using the facility provided. The
essential principle to apply is that the facility to be provided or financed
should be directly related to the development in question or the use of the
land after development. It would not normally be reasonable, for example, to
seek a contribution to road construction or improvement in the immediate
vicinity of the proposed development unless the need for this arises wholly
and substantially from the new development.
Minerals
9. These general considerations hold good in their application to mineral
development. As explained in DoE Circular 1/82 (WO Circular 382), the
Town and Country Planning (Minerals) Act 1981 provides specific powers for
a minerals planning authority to add aftercare conditions to minerals planning
permissions where the land is to be reclaimed for agricultural, forestry or
amenity use. There are also provisions which have not yet been brought into
effect relating to the review of existing workings and, under certain
circumstances, the imposition of up to date conditions. Even when these new
powers are available, there will still be occasions when agreements between
planning authority and developer will be appropriate, or where an agreement
in advance of planning consent is the only way of achieving certain
preliminary works (for example improvements to site [sic] lines at road
junctions). It is also hoped that planning authorities and developers will
continue to enter into voluntary agreements to achieve environmental
improvements where both sides recognise that existing planning conditions
are inadequate or inappropriate. Such agreements reflect the greater
sensitivity towards environmental needs that has developed in recent years,
and in particular an awareness by both the industry and planning authorities
of the need for the restoration of land previously worked but left unrestored
for lack of satisfactory conditions requiring works to be carried out for his
purpose. But advice will be given when the 1981 Act is brought fully into
effect on how the cost to developers of undertaking such voluntary works
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might be taken into account in the compensation calculation which would
follow the subsequent imposition of new conditions.
Provision of Public Access
10. Where open space or other facilities, e.g. amenity walkways, are provided
by the developer, he cannot be required to dedicate these to the public
(though he may volunteer such an arrangement). If local authorities think
general public access appropriate, and the developer does not wish to provide
it, it is for them to seek acquisition of the necessary rights in the land. If the
developer is willing to donate the land to another public body (e.g. a parish
council), that body should be involved in the discussions at the earliest
possible stage.
Maintenance Payments
11. The issue has arisen whether in addition to providing facilities such as
open space or contributing to their capital costs, developers should also be
expected to pay towards their maintenance costs. Where such a facility is of
public benefit and the developer is willing to dedicate it to the public, the
developer's responsibility should be limited to providing what is needed in
the first instance. The cost of subsequent maintenance should normally be
borne by the authority or body in which the asset is to be vested, and the
planning authority should not attempt to impose commuted maintenance
sums when considering the planning aspects of the development. In the case
of small areas of grass or landscaping principally of benefit to the
development itself rather than to the wider public, the developer can
reasonably be expected to make suitable provision for subsequent
maintenance although this is not a matter which can be dealt with by means of
a planning condition.
Cases Involving Other Land or Buildings
12. Obligations imposed on developers may reasonably affect other land
than that covered by the planning permission provided that there is a direct
relationship between the two. For example permission might be given for a
new building where the developer is willing to agree to demolish a nearby
building in which he has a legal interest, the rationale of this being that the
impact of the new building would be offset by the environmental
improvement resulting from the removal of the existing building. Similarly, it
might be appropriate to seek the restoration of a nearby building as a screen
for the new building. However, it would not be appropriate to seek to require
the demolition of a building which is unrelated to the proposed development.
Conclusion
13. This circular is particularly intended to provide guidance to local
authorities about the proper limits of other statutory development control
powers. Where they intend to seek to impose obligations which meet the tests
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set out in this circular, they should, where appropriate, provide guidance to
this effect in development plans. Should authorities seek to impose
unreasonable obligations in connection with a grant of planning permission
the applicant may refuse to accept them and appeal to the appropriate
Secretary of State against a subsequent refusal of permission or imposition of
a condition, or the non-determination of the application. Such appeals will be
considered in the light of the advice given in this circular. Where an appeal
has arisen because of what seems to the Secretaries of State to be an
unreasonable demand on the part of the local planning authority in such a
case, and an inquiry has been held, they will consider sympathetically any
application which may be made to them for the award of costs.
Cancellation
14. Ministry of Housing and Local Government Circular 54/67 (WO
Circular 47/67) is cancelled.
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APPENDIX [2A]
LEGAL ASPECTS
1. The scope for using conditional planning permissions under Part III of
the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 for the purpose of imposing
positive obligations on developers is subject to limitations described in
Ministry of Housing and Local Government and Welsh Office Circulars 5/68
(currently being revised). Any conditions must achieve a proper planning
purpose, be relevant to the development authorised by the permission and be
reasonable in other respects.
2. Some local planning authorities have, under local Acts of Parliament,
powers to impose conditions which are additional to those mentioned in this
Annex or to enter into other forms of agreement.
Scope for Agreements:
Section 52 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971
3. Local authorities are given express powers under section 52 of the Town
and Country Planning Act 1971 to enter into Agreements with persons having
an interest in land for the purpose of "restricting or regulating the
development or use of the land". The advantage of using section 52 is that
provisions in such agreements which are in the nature of negative covenants
are, by virtue of sub-section (2) enforceable by the local planning authority
against successors in title of the person or body who entered into the
agreement. Positive covenants can be included in such agreements provided
that they achieve the purpose of restricting or regulating the use or
development of the land. Incidental and consequential provisions (including
provisions of financial character) which are considered necessary or expedient
for the purposes of the agreement may also be included. It should be noted
that a developer cannot be required to enter into such an agreement by means
of a planning condition.
Section 111 of the Local Government Act 1972
4. There is a general power for local authorities to make agreements with
developers in section 111 of the Local Government Act 1972. It gives local
authorities power "to do anything (whether or not involving the expenditure,
borrowing or lending of money or the acquisition or disposal of any property
or rights) which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the
discharge of their functions". The section would, for instance, enable
agreements to be made for the payment of money or the transfer of assets to a
local authority where this will facilitate the discharge of the functions of the
authority. The section does not empower the local authority to require such a
transfer; the transfer must be by agreement.
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Positive Obligations Running with the Land
5. Some kinds of positive obligations or covenants can be enforced against
successors in title by virtue of section 33 of the Local Government
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 which has replaced section 126 of the
Housing Act 1974. These are covenants which are entered into by a person
with an interest in land undertaking to carry out works or to do any other
thing on or in relation to that land; and they must be contained in an
agreement (made under seal) which:
(a) is made for the purpose of securing the carrying out of works on land
in the Council's area in which the person entering into the covenant has an
interest; or
(b) is made for the purpose of facilitating the development of land (in or
outside the Council's area) in which he has an interest; or
(c) is made for the purpose of regulating the use of land (in or outside
the Council's area) in which he has an interest (e.g. an agreement to use some
of the land as a car park to serve the development on the remainder); or
(d) is otherwise connected with land in which the person entering into
the covenant has an interest (e.g. an obligation to carry out certain demolition
or other works or to pay towards the cost of such works if carried out by the
Council).
Agreements under the Highways Act 1980
6. In certain circumstances, a highway authority who is proposing to carry
out works can enter into an agreement with a developer under section 278 of
the Highways Act 1980 to carry out the works in a particular manner or to
begin or complete the works by a particular date for the benefit of the
developer in return for the making of a contribution by the developer towards
the cost of the works.
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APPENDIX [2B]
Parking Provision
1. Most developments require vehicle parking provision. Space for
operational parking (e.g. service and delivery vehicles) will normally be
expected to be provided on site. Subject to environmental, highway access, or
traffic management considerations, the developer may also be required to
provide appropriate non-operational parking on site. Planning conditions
requiring a maximum or minimum number of spaces should be reasonable in
relation to the size and nature of the development, the availability of public
parking nearby, and local traffic management policies and parking standards.
Consistency with local parking standards cannot be regarded as the sole test
of the reasonableness of a planning condition. The reasonableness of the
standards themselves may be open to question on appeal against refusal of
permission. Local authorities should not include excessive requirements in
parking standards in order to increase their income from commuted
payments.
2. Planning permission may be withheld if reasonable requirements as to the
provision of parking spaces cannot practicably be met on site or on other land
nearby under the control of the applicant, but to overcome such a valid
objection the developer may agree to make a contribution to the provision of
public parking spaces by the local authority. Such contributions may also be
accepted when the developer could accommodate the required number of
parking spaces on site, but would prefer not to do so. Whether the agreement
is to overcome a valid objection to planning permission, or to commute a
valid planning condition, the parking spaces provided should be easily
accessible and convenient to the application site, and should be provided
within a reasonable time. If a significant part of their use is unconnected with
the development this may be reflected in the size of the developer's
contribution. Payments should be no greater than is necessary to overcome a
valid objection to planning permission or to commute a valid requirement
and it follows that they should not be used to finance existing parking spaces
or for purposes unrelated to the development.
3. Similar tests should apply where planning authorities have made it a
deliberate policy to restrict non-operational parking in order to discourage
car commuting or to reduce car use in environmentally sensitive areas.
Where the provision of parking away from the site arises from such policies,
rather than the developer's preference or the limitations of the application
site, the principle still applies that the developer's contribution should be
used only to increase the existing provision, and that the spaces provided
should be as convenient as possible to the users of the development, and
reasonable in relation to its size and nature and to the local authority's
parking standards. The test of proximity to the development may be relaxed
in park and ride or pedestrianisation schemes. The key test is again that
payments should be put to a use which overcomes a valid objection to
planning permission.
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